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Abstract
On14 October 2005,The Hague District Court sentenced twoAfghan asylum seekers
for their role in torture in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Court determined that the
conflict in Afghanistan between 1978 and 1992 had been non-international in char-
acter. In a previous issue of this Journal, Mettraux questioned the need to distinguish
between internal and international armed conflict. This comment argues that the
preoccupation of the court with the nature of the conflict was understandable and
necessary.
In a previous issue of this Journal, Gue¤ nae« l Mettraux commented on two
judgments of The Hague District Court of 14 October 2005, sentencing two
Afghan asylum seekers for their role in torture committed in Afghanistan in
the 1980s. Some of Mettraux’s arguments are not convincing and may give rise
to a misunderstanding of the court’s reasoning.
Mettraux argues that the court’s characterization of the armed conflict
in Afghanistan between 1978 and 1992 as internal was unnecessary, since
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies to all
armed conflicts. This is true as far as the substantive norms, in particular the
prohibition of torture, contained in Common Article 3 are concerned; they
apply in all armed conflicts. This was the point made by the International
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case.1 But the distinction between
internal and international conflicts remains relevant in answering several
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1 Judgment of 27 June 1986, in ICJ Reports 1986, at 114, x 218. See also Special Court for Sierra
Leone, Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae: Nature of the
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other legal questions: the question of Dutch jurisdiction over torture, the
criminality of torture and the question of protected persons.
Mettraux rightly criticizes the court’s finding that it had universal
jurisdiction over the acts concerned. The court came to that conclusion
on the basis of paragraph 3 common to Articles 49/50/129/146 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, stipulating that states shall also ‘take measures
necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of
the present convention other than the grave breaches’. Indeed, these
paragraphs may be read as a basis for criminalization of violations of
Common Article 3, but they do not provide for jurisdiction, let alone universal
jurisdiction. Arguably, Dutch law provides for such universal jurisdiction
over violations of Common Article 3, but it is highly questionable whether
a national rule alone is a sufficient basis for universal jurisdiction, in the
absence of an international rule obliging or at least entitling states to exercise
such jurisdiction.2
In contrast, if the conflict had been qualified as international, the grave
breaches provisions (paragraph 1 common to Articles 49/50/129/146) would
have provided the court with a sound basis for universal jurisdiction.3
The question whether torture was criminalized in Afghanistan in the 1980s
may be answered differently, depending on whether the legal regime for
internal or international conflicts applies. Common Article 3 merely prohibits
certain acts, and stops short of criminalizing them. As stated above, the
Geneva Conventions, in the aforementioned articles, oblige states to take
measures to suppress acts contrary to the Geneva Conventions other than
grave breaches. Article 8 of the Dutch Criminal Law in Wartime Act, in turn,
provides for criminal liability for violations of the laws and customs of war.
However, leaving aside the question whether the Dutch Act was also intended
to include violations of Common Article 3 committed in the 1980s, as such ç
as a domestic law ç it is clearly a deficient basis for the criminalization
under Dutch law of acts committed in Afghanistan. In the absence of a written
international rule criminalizing torture committed in the 1980s in internal
conflict, the prosecution suggested that the court should rely on customary
international law, complementing Dutch domestic law. Instead, the court
simply applied the Dutch Criminal Law inWartime Act. In so doing, the court
arguably violated the Dutch and international nullum crimen sine lege principle,
2 See P.H. Kooijmans, Internationaal Publiekrecht in Vogelvlucht (8th edn., Deventer: Kluwer,
2000), at 56; see also A. Nollkaemper, Kern van het Internationaal Publiekrecht, (2nd edn., The
Hague: Boom Jurdische Studieboeken, 2005), xx 258, 259.
3 See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Tadic¤ (IT-94-1),
Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, xx79^80 (‘[I]t is widely contended that the grave breaches
provisions establish universal mandatory jurisdiction only with respect to those breaches of
the Conventions committed in international armed conflicts’). Afghanistan has been a party to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions since 1956.
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requiring that the act underlying the charge was punishable at the time when
and the place where it was committed.4
Had the conflict been qualified as international, on the other hand,
the criminality of torture might have been derived from the grave breaches
provisions in the Geneva Conventions.
Finally, the question of protected persons could have been solved differently
by the court if it had characterized the Afghan conflict as international.
Mettraux argues that under Common Article 3 protected persons must be
either civilians or someone who was ‘taking no active part in the hostilities’.
Yet, in addition, Common Article 3 was intended to apply only to enemy
persons. As Cassese wrote:
In time of war or internal armed conflict a serviceman may incur criminal liability for a war
crime if he engages in torture against an enemy military or enemy civilian.5
The court recognized that only persons belonging to the ‘other’ party are
protected under Common Article 3.6 Yet, the test it applied to determine
whether the alleged victims actually fell within this category would have
been different, had the court characterized the conflict as international,
rather than internal. In that case, for torture to qualify as a war crime, it
must have been committed against a member of the enemy belligerent army
(or other lawful combatants), or against a protected person who either has
the nationality or ethnicity of the enemy or is otherwise objectively distinctive.
In the case of internal armed conflict, on the other hand, torture must either
have been committed against a member of the adversary who has laid down
his weapons or has been placed hors de combat, or against a protected person
who is under the control of the adversary.
For these reasons the preoccupation of the court with the nature of the
conflict was understandable and necessary. Unlike Mettraux, I would say that
its finding that the conflict was internal has had a considerable impact on the
verdict, touching on the jurisdiction of the Dutch district court, the criminality
of torture, and the protected status of the alleged victims.
4 Article 1 of the Dutch Criminal Code and Art. 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights
(see judgment no. 73/2005, with reference to ECHR 25 May 1993, Kokkinakis v. Greece, A260-A,
25 May 1993, x52).
5 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 117.
6 Verdict, at 33.
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